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PATERNITY AND CHILD CUSTODY: EQUITABLE ADOPTION DOCTRINE 
 
Summary 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court held that granting joint legal and physical custody to the non-
adoptive parent in a same-sex couple adoption does not violate the equitable adoption doctrine or 
the equal protection clauses of the United States and Nevada State Constitutions.  
 
Background 
  
Ken Nguyen (“Ken”) and Rob Boynes (“Rob”), a same-sex couple, decided to adopt a child 
from Catholic Charities of Southern Nevada (“Catholic Charities”). At that time, Catholic 
Charities disallowed joint adoptions for same-sex couples. As such, Rob testified that Ken would 
adopt the child first and Rob would later also adopt the child. In February 2013, Catholic Charities 
notified Ken that it was placing a child with him for adoption.  
 
In May 2013, the parties ended their relationship. Around this time, Rob asked Ken to add 
his name to the child's birth certificate, and Ken refused. In October 2013, Ken formally adopted 
the child. During the adoption hearing, Ken reiterated that he would neither place Rob's name on 
the child's birth certificate nor allow a second-parent adoption.  
 
However, both parties participated in every step of the adoption process. At the baby 
shower, guests addressed cards to both Ken and Rob. Both parties were present to receive the 
newborn child. The baptism certificate lists both parties as the child’s parents. Further, both parties 
were present to receive the child for placement, and the child stayed at Rob's house during the first 
night. 
 
In May 2014, Rob filed a petition for paternity and custody. The district court issued an 
order holding, inter alia, that (1) Rob was entitled to a presumption of paternity under NRS 
126.051(1)(d), and (2) Rob and Ken were to have joint legal and physical custody of the child. 
Ken now appeals the district court's order. 
 
Discussion 
 
The district court did not err in granting Rob paternity  
 
The district court properly applied the doctrine of equitable adoption finding that Rob was the 
adoptive father even though this was not a custody suit.  
 
The doctrine of equitable adoption applies in this case 
 
Equitable adoption is an equitable remedy to enforce an adoption agreement under 
circumstances "where there is a promise to adopt, and in reasonable, foreseeable reliance on that 
																																																						
1  By Angela Lee. 
promise a child is placed in a position where harm will result if repudiation is permitted."2 In past 
cases, the Court declined to extend the equitable adoption doctrine to determine legal parentage 
between a biological and nonbiological parent, specifically where a putative father's biological 
relationship with a child is in dispute.3 Instead, this Court held that a determination of parentage 
as to whether a putative parent is the natural parent of the child falls within the purview of Nevada's 
Uniform Parentage Act (“NUPA”).4 
 
However, unlike past cases, Ken and Rob did not dispute their nonbiological parentage as 
required to implicate the NUPA. Instead, this case concerned whether the parties had agreed to 
adopt the child together at the beginning of the adoption process and whether accompanying that 
agreement was an intent and promise by Ken to allow Rob to adopt the child later given Catholic 
Charities' policy disallowing joint adoptions for same-sex couples. Thus, the equitable adoption 
doctrine applied to enforce an adoption agreement under this case’s unique factual circumstances.5 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Rob paternity under the equitable 
adoption doctrine  
 
The district court did not err in granting Rob paternity through equitable adoption of the 
child. The facts of this case satisfied the four elements of equitable adoption: (1) intent to adopt, 
(2) promise to adopt, (3) justifiable reliance, and (4) harm resulting from repudiation.6 
 
Regarding the first and second factors, substantial evidence supported the district court's 
finding that the parties intended for Ken to adopt the child first and Rob second. Further, that intent 
was accompanied by a promise from Ken to allow Rob to do so. Rob was an integral factor in the 
child's adoption and was intimately involved with the adoption process. Moreover, Ken treated 
Rob as a second parent to the child before the commencement of the underlying suit. 
  
Third, substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that Rob justifiably relied 
on Ken's promise to allow him to adopt second. Rob acted upon that promise to his detriment. Rob 
dedicated a substantial amount of his time to the adoption process. Moreover, Rob primarily cared 
for the child post-placement. Rob also made substantial changes to his house and lifestyle to 
accommodate the child's needs, which included changing one of the rooms in his house to a 
nursery.  
 
Finally, the resulting harm from Ken's repudiation would be the deprivation of Rob's 
emotional and financial support to the child. As such, if Ken “were allowed to renege with 
impunity, it would be to the probable detriment of an innocent child," and "[e]quity cannot allow 
such a result."7 Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's application of the equitable 
adoption doctrine and grant of paternity to Rob. 
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The district court's order did not violate the United States and Nevada Constitutions' equal 
protection clauses  
 
"The threshold question in [an] equal protection analysis is whether a statute effectuates 
dissimilar treatment of similarly situated persons."8 Ken did not challenge the constitutionality of 
a particular statute. Instead, he alleged that the district court treated the parties differently than it 
would have a heterosexual couple. However, "[c]hild custody determinations are by necessity 
made on a case- by-case basis," and, here, "there is nothing to indicate that the ultimate decision 
of the district court turned on [the couple's sexual orientation]."9 Thus, the Court held that the 
district court did not violate the United States and Nevada Constitutions' equal protection clauses 
in granting its order of paternity and child custody.  
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Rob joint legal and physical custody  
 
Ken argued that the district court erred in awarding Rob joint legal and physical custody 
of the child because the district court failed to properly consider Rob's mental health. However, 
Ken’s argument is without merit because (1) "[t]here was nothing noteworthy" regarding both 
parties’ mental and physical health, (2) the single harassing email sent by Rob was not sufficient 
to create a showing of "obsessed stalking behavior," and (3) both parties "parented with no major 
incident even during the so-called cyberstalking period." Further, the testimonies of Ken and Rob 
indicate that both parties were able to take care of the child in a joint effort despite the harassing 
emails. Thus, both parents were mentally fit to take care of the child.  
 
Ken also argues that Rob intentionally destroyed his computer and lied about the 
destruction date to avoid disclosing evidence of his stalking behavior contained on the computer. 
Ken argues that the district court should have found such evidence willfully suppressed and 
deemed adverse to Rob. However, only inconclusive evidence existed to support a spoliation claim 
against Rob. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's order granting Rob joint legal and 
physical custody of the child.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The district court did not err in granting Rob paternity under the equitable adoption 
doctrine. Furthermore, the district court's order did not violate the United States and Nevada 
Constitutions' equal protection clauses. Lastly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting Rob joint legal and physical custody. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court's order granting Rob paternity and joint legal and physical custody of the child.  
 
Concurring 
 
STIGLICH, J., with whom CHERRY, C J, and HARDESTY, J., agree, concurring: 
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The district court did not err in granting Rob paternity. However, the Nevada Parentage 
Act is a more appropriate analysis for the facts of this case, rather than the doctrine of equitable 
adoption.  
Nevada law does not preclude a child from having two mothers under the Nevada 
Parentage Act.10 Accordingly, this court held that maternity could be proved by (1) offering proof 
to establish that the appellant is the child's legal mother; or (2) applying paternity statutes "insofar 
as practicable" under NRS 126.05111. 
 
If a presumption of parentage can apply to a woman in a same-sex relationship, there 
appears no reason why the provisions of NRS 126.051 cannot apply to a man in a same-sex 
relationship. Rob submitted ample evidence to support the presumption of parentage under NRS 
126.051(1). Therefore, the judges concurred with the majority's holding affirming the decision of 
the district court, but on different grounds. 
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